A damped forward-backward algorithm for stochastic generalized Nash
  equilibrium seeking by Franci, Barbara & Grammatico, Sergio
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
11
77
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
5 O
ct 
20
19
A damped forward–backward algorithm for stochastic generalized Nash
equilibrium seeking
Barbara Franci1 and Sergio Grammatico1
Abstract—We consider a stochastic generalized Nash equi-
librium problem (GNEP) with expected–value cost functions.
Inspired by Yi and Pavel (Automatica, 2019), we propose a
distributed GNE seeking algorithm by exploiting the forward–
backward operator splitting and a suitable preconditioning ma-
trix. Specifically, we apply this method to the stochastic GNEP,
where, at each iteration, the expected value of the pseudo–
gradient is approximated via a number of random samples.
Our main contribution is to show almost sure convergence of
our proposed algorithm if the sample size grows large enough.
I. INTRODUCTION
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) have
been widely studied in literature. A number of results are
present concerning algorithms and methodologies to find
an equilibrium, see [1], [2], [3] and the references therein.
The reason for this interest is related with the potential
applications ranging from economics to engineering via
operation research [4], [5]. In a GNEP, each agent aims
at minimizing his own cost function, under some feasibility
constraints. The main feature is that both the cost function
and the constraints depend on the strategy chosen by the
other agents. Due to the presence of shared constraints, the
search for a generalized Nash equilibrium is a challenging
task in general.
In the deterministic case, several algorithms are available
for finding a GNE, both distributed and semi-decentralized
[1], [6], [7], [8]. Among the available methods for GNEP,
an elegant approach is to recast the problem as a monotone
inclusion through the use of interdependent Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker (KKT) conditions. The resulting Lagrangian formu-
lation allows one to seek equilibrium points as the solutions
of an associated variational inequality (VI) that is usually
more tractable and the literature is wider than the GNEPs
literature [9], [3] (and reference therein). Equilibria obtained
in this way are called variational equilibria.
Given a monotone inclusion problem, a powerful proce-
dure is to use an operator splitting scheme to recast the
problem as the search for the zeros of a sum of two monotone
operators. One of the simplest schemes is the forward–
backward (FB) operator splitting [9]. Convergence of such a
scheme is guaranteed if the pseudo-gradient mapping of the
game is strongly monotone. Since we study a game-theoretic
problem, the algorithm should be distributed, in the sense
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that each agent should only know his local cost function and
his local constraints. Unfortunately, the FB splitting does not
lead to a distributed algorithm when applied to a GNEP. In
the deterministic case, preconditioning has been proposed in
[6], [7] to overcome this problem.
To the best of our knowledge, the preconditioned FB op-
erator splitting has not been exploited for stochastic GNEPs
(SGNEPs) but it would be very relevant from an algorithmic
perspective.
The literature on stochastic Nash equilibrium problems
is less rich than its deterministic counterpart [10], [11],
[12]. Nevertheless, several problems of interest cannot be
modelled without uncertainty. Among others, consider trans-
portation systems, where one of the source of uncertainty is
due to the drivers perception of travel time [13]; electricity
markets where generators produce energy without knowing
the actual demand [14]; or, more generally, problems that
can be modelled as networked Cournot games with market
capacity constraints where the demand is uncertain [15], [16].
Mathematically speaking, a SGNEP is a GNEP where the
cost functions of the agents are expected–value functions
and the distribution of the random variables is unknown.
Existence (and uniqueness) of equilibria is studied in [11] but
the study of convergence algorithms is not fully developed
yet [12], [10].
One possible motivation for that is the presence of the
expected–value cost functions. When the probability distri-
bution of the random variable is known, the expected value
formulation can be solved with a technique for deterministic
VI. However, the pseudo gradient is usually not directly
accessible, for instance due to the intractability of computing
the expected value. For this reason, in many cases, the
solution of a stochastic VI relies on samples of the random
variable. There are, in fact, two main methodologies avail-
able: sample average approximation (SAA) and stochastic
approximation (SA). The SAA approach replaces the ex-
pected value with the average over a huge number of samples
of the random variable. This approach is practical in Monte
Carlo Simulations or machine learning, when there is a huge
number of data available [17], [18]. In the SA approach, the
decision maker sample only one realization of the random
variable. This approach is less computationally expensive
and more appropriate in a decentralized framework but, in
general, it requires stronger assumptions of the problem data
[19], [20], [21].
In this paper, we formulate a distributed stochastic FB
algorithm through preconditioning and prove its consequent
convergence. The associated SVI is obtained in the same way
as the deterministic case, i.e., via augmented KKT inclusions.
Among the possible approaches for solving an SVI (for
instance [19], [18], [20]), we propose a damped forward–
backward scheme [22] and prove convergence under proper
assumptions, i.e., strong monotonicity of the pseudo gradient
game mapping and measurability of the random variable.
Notation: 〈·, ·〉 : Rn×Rn → R denotes the standard inner
product and ‖·‖ represents the associated euclidean norm.
Given a symmetric positive definite matrix Φ, denote the Φ-
induced inner product, 〈x, y〉Φ = 〈Φx, y〉. The associated
Φ-induced norm, ‖·‖Φ, is defined as ‖x‖Φ =
√
〈Φx, x〉. We
indicate that a matrix A is positive definite, i.e., x⊤Ax > 0,
with A ≻ 0. A⊗B indicates the Kronecker product between
matrices A and B. 0m indicates the vector with m entries
all equal to 0. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn,x :=
col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
. JF = (I+F )
−1 is the
resolvent of the operator F and I indicates the identity
operator. For a closed set C ⊆ Rn, the mapping projC :
Rn → C denotes the projection onto C, i.e., projC(x) =
argminy∈C ‖y − x‖. ιC is the indicator function of the set
C, that is, ιC(x) = 1 if x ∈ C and ιC(x) = 0 otherwise.
The set-valued mapping NC : R
n → Rn denotes the normal
cone operator for the the set C , i.e., NC(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ C,
{
v ∈ Rn| supz∈C v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. For a
function ψ : Rn → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈ Rn|ψ(x) < ∞}
indicates the domain and the subdifferential is the set-valued
mapping ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈ Rn|ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) + v⊤(z −
x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)}.
II. GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
A. Equilibrium Problem setup
We consider a set I = {1, . . . , N} of noncooperative
agents, each of them deciding on its strategy xi ∈ Rni from
its local decision set Ωi ∈ Rni with the aim of minimizing its
local cost function. Let x−i = col((xj)j 6=i) be the decisions
of all the agents except for i and define n =
∑N
i=1 ni. We
consider that there is some uncertainty in the cost function,
expressed through the random variable ξ : Ξ → Rd, where
(Ξ,F ,P) is the associated probability space. Then, for each
agent i ∈ I, we define the cost function Ji : Rn → R as
Ji(xi,x−i) := Eξ[Ji(xi,x−i, ξ(ω))] (1)
for some measurable function Ji : R
n × Rd → R. We note
that the cost function depends on the local variable xi, the
collective decision of the other agents x−i and the random
variable ξ(ω). Eξ represents the mathematical expectation
with respect to the distribution of the random variable ξ1. We
assume that E[Ji(x, ξ)] is well defined for all the feasible
x = col(x1, . . . , xN ). Furthermore, we consider a game
with affine shared constraints, Ax ≤ b. Thus we denote the
feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I by the set-valued
mapping
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi | Aiyi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj
}
, (2)
1For brevity, we use ξ instead of ξ(ω), where ω ∈ Ξ, and E instead of
Eξ .
where Ai ∈ Rm×ni and b ∈ Rm. The matrix Ai defines how
agent i is involved in the coupling constraints. The collective
feasible set can be then written as
X = Ω ∩ {y ∈ Rn|Ay − b ≤ 0m} (3)
where Ω =
∏N
i=1Ωi and A = [A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ R
m×n. Note
that there is no uncertainty in the constraints.
Next, we postulate standard assumptions for the cost
functions and the constraints set.
Standing Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i
the function Ji(·,x−i) is convex and continuously differen-
tiable. 
Standing Assumption 2: For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is
nonempty, compact and convex. The set X satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification. 
Formally, the aim of each agent i, given the decision
variables of the other agents x−i, is to choose a strategy
xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji(xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b −
∑N
j 6=i Ajxj .
(4)
From a game-theoretic perspective, we aim at computing
a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE), i.e., a
collective strategy x∗ ∈ X such that, for all i ∈ I:
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x
∗
−i) | y ∈ Xi(x
∗
−i)}.
In other words, a SGNE is a set of strategies where no
agent can decrease its objective function by unilaterally
changing its strategy. To guarantee existence of a stochastic
equilibrium, let us introduce further assumptions on the local
cost functions Ji.
Standing Assumption 3: For each i ∈ I and ξ ∈ Ξ,
the function Ji(·,x−i, ξ) is convex, Lipschitz continuous,
and continuously differentiable. The function Ji(xi,x−i, ·)
is measurable and for each x−i, the Lipschitz constant
ℓi(x−i, ξ) is integrable in ξ. 
While, under Standing Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, existence
of a GNE of the game is guaranteed by [11, §3.1], uniqueness
does not hold in general [11, §3.2].
Within all possible Nash equilibria, we focus on those that
corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate (stochastic)
variational inequality. Let
F(x) = col (E[∇x1J1(x1,x−1)], . . . ,E[∇xNJN (xN ,x−N )]) .
(5)
Formally, the stochastic variational inequality problem
SVI(X ,F) is the problem of finding x∗ ∈ X such that
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X . (6)
with F(x) as in (5). We note that we can exchange the
expected value and the gradient in (5) thanks to Standing
Assumption 3 [11, Lem. 3.4]. We also note that any solution
of SVI(X ,F) is a generalized Nash equilibrium of the game
in (4) while the opposite does not hold in general. In fact, a
game may have a Nash equilibrium while the corresponding
VI may have no solution [23, Prop. 12.7].
A sufficient condition for the variational problem in (6) to
have a solution is that F is strongly monotone [3, Th. 2.3.3],
[11, Lemma 3.3], as we postulate next.
Standing Assumption 4: F is η-strongly monotone, i.e.,
for η > 0
〈F(x)− F(y), x− y〉 ≥ η ‖x− y‖2 for all x, y ∈ Rn
and ℓ-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ℓ > 0
‖F(x)− F(y)‖ ≤ ℓ ‖x− y‖ for all x, y ∈ Rn.

B. Operator-theoretic characterization
In this subsection, we recast the GNEP into a monotone
inclusion, namely, the problem of finding a zero of a set-
valued monotone operator.
First, we characterize the SGNE of the game in terms
of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions for the coupled op-
timization problems in (4). For each agent i ∈ I, let us
introduce the Lagrangian function Li as
Li (x, λi) := Ji(xi,x−i) + ιΩi (xi) + λ
⊤
i (Ax− b)
where λi ∈ R
m
≥0 is the dual variable associated with the
coupling constraints. We recall that the set of strategies x∗
is a SGNE if and only if the following KKT conditions are
satisfied [1, Th. 4.6]:{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i, ξ)] + NΩi (x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λi
0 ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(7)
Similarly, we can use the KKT conditions to characterize
a variational GNEP (v-GNEP), studying the Lagrangian
function associated to the SVI. Since x∗ is a solution of
SVI(X ,F) if and only if
x∗ ∈ argmin
y∈X (y − x
∗)
⊤
F (x∗) ,
the associated KKT optimality conditions are{
0 ∈ E[∇xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i, ξ)] + NΩi (x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ, ∀i ∈ I
0 ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(8)
We note that (8) can be written in compact form as
0 ∈ T (x,λ) :=
[
NΩ(x) + F(x) +A
⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ) − (Ax− b)
]
,
where T : X × Rm≥0 ⇒ R
n × Rm is a set-valued mapping.
It follows that the v-GNE correspond to the zeros of the
mapping T . The next proposition shows the relation between
SGNE and variational equilibria.
Lemma 1: [24, Th. 3.1] The following statements hold:
1) Let x∗ be a solution of SVI(X ,F) at which the KKT
conditions (8) hold. Then x∗ is a solution of the
SGNEP at which the KKT conditions (7) hold with
λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN = λ∗
2) Viceversa, let x∗ be a solution of the SGNEP at which
KKT conditions (7) hold with λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λN =
λ∗. Then, x∗ is a solution of SVI(X ,F). 
Essentially, Lemma 1 says that variational equilibria are
those such that the shared constraints have the same dual
variable for all the agents.
III. PRECONDITIONED FORWARD–BACKWARD
GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
In this section, we propose a distributed forward–backward
algorithm for finding variational equilibria of the game in (4).
We suppose that each player i only knows its local data,
i.e., Ωi, Ai and bi. Moreover, each player is able to compute,
given col(xi,x−i), E[∇xiJi(xi,x−i, ξ)] (or an approxima-
tion, as exploited later in the section). We assume therefore
that each agent has access to the strategies that affect its
local gradient (full information setup). These information are
collected, for each agent i, in the set N Ji , that is, the set of
agents j whose strategy xj explicitly influences Ji.
Since, by Lemma 1, the configuration of the v-GNE
requires consensus of the dual variables, we introduce an
auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm for all i ∈ I. The role of
z = col(z1, . . . , zN ) is to enforce consensus but it does not
affect the property of the operators and of the algorithm.
More details on this variable are given in Section IV-A. The
auxiliary variable and a local copy of the dual variable λi
are shared through the dual variables graph, Gλ = (I, Eλ).
The set of edges Eλ represents the exchange of the private
information on the dual variables: (i, j) ∈ Eλ if player i can
receive {λj , zj} from player j. The set of neighbours of i in
Gλ is given by N
λ
i = {j|(j, i) ∈ Eλ} [7], [10].
Standing Assumption 5: The dual variable graph is undi-
rected and connected. 
The weighted adjacency matrix of the dual variables graph
is indicated with W ∈ RN×N . Let L = D −W ∈ RN×N
be the Laplacian matrix associated to the adjacency matrix
W , where D = diag(d1, . . . , dN ) is the diagonal matrix of
the degrees and di =
∑N
j=1 wi,j . It follows from Standing
Assumption 5 that W and the associated Laplacian L are
both symmetric, i.e., W = W⊤ and L = L⊤. Moreover,
Standing Assumption 5 is fundamental to guarantee that the
coupling constraints are satisfied since agents have to reach
consensus of the dual variables.
Next we present a distributed forward–backward algorithm
with damping for solving the SGNEP in (4) (Algorithm 1).
For each agent i, the variables xki , z
k
i and λ
k
i denote the local
variables xi, zi and λi at the iteration time k while αi, νi
and σi are the step sizes.
Since the distribution of the random variable is unknown,
in the algorithm we have replaced the expected value with
a sample average approximation (SAA). We assume to have
access to a pool of i.i.d. sample realizations of the random
variable collected, for all k ∈ N and for each agent i ∈ I,
in the vectors ξki . At each time k, we have
Fˆi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
k
i ) :=
1
Nk
N∑
s=1
∇xiJi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
(s)
i ) (9)
where Nk is the batch size. As usual in SAA, we assume that
the batch size increases over time according to the following
lower bound.
Assumption 1: There exist c, k0, a > 0 such that, for all
k ∈ N
Nk ≥ c(k+k0)
a+1. 
Algorithm 1 Distributed Stochastic Forward–Backward with
Sample Average Approximation
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ
0
i ∈ R
m
≥0, and z
0
i ∈ R
m. Iteration k:
Agent i
(1): Receives xj,k for all j ∈ N hi , λ
k
j for j ∈ N
λ
i then
updates:
x˜ki = projΩi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(x
k
i ,x
k
−i, ξ
k
i )−A
⊤
i λ
k
i )]
z˜ki = z
k
i + vi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
(2): Receives zj,k+1 for all j ∈ N λi then updates:
λ˜ki = projRm
+
[
λki + σi
(
Ai(2x˜
k
i − x
k
i )− bi
)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j
(
2(z˜ki − z˜
k
j )− (z
k
i − z
k
j )
)
− σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λ
k
j )
]
xk+1i = (1 − δ)x
k
i + δx˜
k
i
zk+1i = (1 − δ)z
k
i + δz˜
k
i
λk+1i = (1 − δ)λ
k
i + δλ˜
k
i
Next, we postulate that the distance of the expected value
and its approximation,
ǫk = Fˆ (xk, ξk)− F(xk), (10)
has a vanishing second moment for all k ∈ N.
Assumption 2: For all k and C > 0, the stochastic error
is such that
E
[∥∥ǫk∥∥2 |Fk] ≤ Cσ2
Nk
. 
Such a bound for the stochastic error can be obtained as a
consequence of some milder assumptions that lay outside the
scope of this work. We refer to [17, Lem. 4.2], [18, Lem.
3.12] for more details.
Furthermore, we assume that the step sizes are small
enough as formalized next.
Standing Assumption 6: Let δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let di =∑N
j=1 wi,j and define d
∗ = maxi∈N {di}. Let
0 < β ≤ min
{
1
2d∗
,
η
ℓ2
}
. (11)
where η and ℓ are respectively the strongly monotone and
the Lipschitz constants as in Standing Assumption 4. The
parameter τ is positive and τ < 12β . The step sizes α, ν and
σ satisfy, for any agent i
0 < αi ≤
(
max
j=1,...,ni
{
∑m
k=1
|[ATi ]jk|}+ τ
)−1
0 < νi ≤ (2di + τ)
−1
0 < σi ≤
(
max
j=1,...,m
{
∑ki
k=1
|[Ai]jk|}+ 2di + τ
)−1 (12)
where [A⊤i ]jk indicates the entry (j, k) of the matrix A
⊤
i . 
An insight on these conditions is given in Section IV.
We are now ready to state our convergence result.
Theorem 1: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the
sequence generated by Algorithm 1 with Fˆi as in (9) for
all i ∈ N converges to a v-GNE of the game in (4).
Proof: See Section IV.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
A. Preconditioned forward backward operator splitting
In this section, we prove convergence of Algorithm 1. Let
Assumptions 1 - 6 hold.
We first note that the mapping T can be written as the
sum of two operators. Specifically, T = A+ B where
A :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
F(x)
b
]
B :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x)
NRm
≥0
(λ)
]
+
[
0 A⊤
−A 0
] [
x
λ
]
.
(13)
We note that finding a solution of the variational SGNEP
translates in finding x∗ ∈ zer(A+ B).
Let L be the Laplacian matrix of Gλ and set L =
L ⊗ Im ∈ RNm×Nm. To impose consensus on the dual
variables, the authors in [7] proposed the Laplacian constraint
Lλ = 0. Then, to preserve monotonicity one can augment
the two operators A and B introducing the auxiliary variable
z. Define A = diag{A1, . . . , AN} ∈ RNm×n and λ =
col(λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RNm and similarly let us define b¯ of
suitable dimensions. Then, we introduce
A¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 F(x)0
b¯

+

 00
Lλ


B¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 NΩ(x)0mN
NRm
≥0
(λ)

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

 .
(14)
From now on, let us indicate ω = col(x, z,λ). The operators
A¯ and B¯ in (14) have the following properties.
Lemma 2: The operator B¯ is maximally monotone and A¯
is β-cocoercive with β as in (11).
Proof: It follows from [7, Lem. 5].
Notice that this result explains the choice of the parameter
β in Assumption 6. The following theorem shows that the
points ω ∈ zer(A¯+ B¯) provide a variational equilibrium of
the SGNEP.
Lemma 3: Consider the operators A¯ and B¯ in (14), and
the operators A and B in (13). Then the following hold.
(i) Given any ω∗ ∈ zer(A¯ + B¯), x∗ is a v-GNE of game
in (4), i.e., x∗ solves the SVI(X ,F) in (6). Moreover
λ∗ = 1N ⊗λ∗, and (x∗, λ∗) satisfy the KKT condition
in (8) i.e., col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+ B)
(ii) zer(A+ B) 6= ∅ and zer(A¯+ B¯) 6= ∅
Proof: It follows from [7, Th. 2].
Unfortunately, the operator B¯ is monotone but not co-
coercive, due to the skew symmetric matrix, hence, we
cannot directly apply the FB operator splitting [9, §26.5].
To overcome this issue, the authors in [7] introduced a
preconditioning matrix Φ. Thanks to Φ, the zeros of the
mapping T correspond to the fixed point of a specific
operator that depends on the operators A¯ and B¯ as exploited
in [6], [7]. Indeed, it holds that, for any matrix Φ ≻ 0,
ω ∈ zer(A¯+ B¯) if and only if,
ω = JΦ−1B¯(I−Φ
−1A¯)(ω) (15)
where JΦ−1B¯ = (Id + Φ
−1B¯)−1 is the resolvent of B¯ and
represent the backward step and (Id−Φ−1A¯) is the (stochas-
tic) forward step. In the deterministic case, convergence of
the FB splitting is guaranteed by [9, Section 26.5]. In the
stochastic case, the FB algorithm, as it is in (15), is known
to converge for strongly monotone mappings [12]. For this
reason, we focus on the following damped FB algorithm{
ω˜k = JΦ−1B¯(Id− Φ
−1A¯)(ωk)
ωk+1 = (1− δk)ωk + δkω˜k
(16)
that converges with cocoercivity of Φ−1A¯ [22]. We show
that this is true in Lemma 4. First, we show that (16) is
equivalent to Algorithm 1.
Note that, if we write the resolvent explicitly, the first step
of Equation (16) can be rewritten as
− A¯(ωk) ∈ B¯(ω˜k) + Φ(ω˜k − ωk). (17)
The matrix Φ should be symmetric, positive definite and such
that ωk is easy to be computed [6].
We define α−1 = diag{α−11 In1 , . . . , α
−1
N InN} ∈ R
n×n
and similarly σ−1 and ν−1 of suitable dimensions. Let
Φ =

 α−1 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1

 . (18)
and suppose that the parameters αi, νi and σi satisfy (12) in
Standing Assumption 6.
We can obtain conditions (12) imposing Φ to be diagonally
dominant. This, in combination with the fact that it is
symmetric, implies that Φ is also positive definite. Then, the
operators Φ−1A¯ and Φ−1B¯ satisfy the following properties
under the Φ-induced norm ‖·‖Φ.
Lemma 4: Given A¯ and B¯ in (14), the following state-
ments hold:
(i) Φ−1A¯ is βτ -cocoercive;
(ii) Φ−1B¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof: It follows from [7, Lem. 7].
B. Stochastic sample average approximation
Since the expected value can be hard to compute, we need
to take an approximation. At this stage, it is not important
if we use sample average or stochastic approximation, there-
fore, in what follows, we replace A¯ with
Aˆ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
b¯

+

 00
Lλ


where Fˆ is an approximation of the expected value mapping
F in (5) given a vector sample of the random variable ξ.
Then, (17) can be rewritten as
−

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
Lλ+ b¯

 ∈

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 x˜kz˜k
λ˜k


+

 α−1 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1



 x˜k − xkz˜k − zk
λ˜k − λk


(19)
By expanding (19), we obtain the first steps of Algorithm
1. The damping part is distributed and it does not need
preconditioning.
We note that, thanks to the fact that Φ+ B¯ is lower block
triangular, the iterations of Algorithm 1 are sequential, that
is, λ˜k use the last update x˜k and z˜k of the agents strategies
and of the auxiliary variable respectively.
We are now ready to prove our convergence result.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 1] The iterations of Algorithm
1 are obtained by expanding (16), solving for x˜k , z˜k and λ˜k
and adding the damping iteration. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is
the FB iteration with damping as in (16). The convergence
of the sequence (xk,λk) to a v-GNE of the game in (4)
then follows by [22, Th. 3.2] and Lemma 3 since Φ−1A¯ is
cocoercive by Lemma 2.
C. Discussion
The original result in [22] shows convergence for coco-
ercive and uniformly monotone operators. Moreover, they
provide the proof for a generic approximation of the random
mapping F. We note that fixing the type of approximation
(SAA or SA) can be important for weakening the assump-
tions. Indeed, using the SAA scheme, cocoercivity is enough
for convergence without further monotonicity assumptions.
On the other hand, the SA approach requires cocoercivity
and strict monotonicity.
Unfortunately, the mapping Φ−1A¯ is not strictly monotone
(due to the presence of the Laplacian matrix), therefore we
use SAA as in (9).
Concerning the stochastic error ǫk in (10), the assumption
in [22] is similar to the so-called ”variance reduction”. Such
an assumption is fundamental in the SAA scheme, but it
can be avoided in the SA method [19]. Indeed, in the
SAA scheme, taking the average over a huge number of
samples helps controlling the stochastic error and therefore
finding a solution [18], [25]. For this reason, in our case the
stepsize can be taken constant. For the SA scheme instead,
the error is controlled in combination with the parameters
involved, for instance, using a vanishing stepsize (possibly
square summable) [26] or using smoothing techniques (as
a Tikhonov regularization) [19]. In both cases, the damping
parameter δ can be taken constant.
V. CASE STUDY AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
As an example, we borrow an electricity market problem
from [12] which can also be casted as a network Cournot
game with markets capacity constraints [7], [10].
Consider a set of N generators (companies) that operate
over a set of m locations (markets). The random variable
ξ represent the demand uncertainty. Each generator decides
the quantity xi of product to deliver in the ni markets it
is connected with. Each company has a local cost function
ci(xi) related to the production of electricity. The cost func-
tion is deterministic as we suppose that the generators are
able to compute the cost for production without uncertainty.
On the other hand, each market has a bounded capacity
bj so that the collective constraints are given by Ax ≤ b
where A = [A1, . . . , AN ] and Ai specifies which market
company i participates in. Each location has a price, collected
in P : Rm × Ξ → Rm. The uncertainty variable appears in
this functional since this is the part related to the demand.
P is supposed to be a linear function. The cost function of
each agent is then given by
Ji(xi, x−i, ξ) = ci(xi)− E[P (ξ)
⊤(Ax)Aixi].
Clearly, if ci(xi) is strongly convex with Lipschitz contin-
uous gradient and the prices are linear, the pseudo gradient
of Ji is strongly monotone and Standing Assumption 1 is
satisfied.
A. Numerical example
As a numerical setting, we consider a set of 20 companies
and 7 markets, similarly to [7], [10]. Each company i has
has a local constraint 0 < xi < γi and each component of
γi is randomly drawn from [1, 1.5]. In terms of electricity
market, this can be seen as the capacity limit of generator i.
Each market j has a maximal capacity bj randomly drawn
from [0.5, 1]. The local cost function of the generator i is
ci(xi) = πi
∑ni
j=1([xi]j)
2+g⊤i xi, where [xi]j indicates the j
component of xi. πi is randomly drawn from [1, 8], and each
component of gi is randomly drawn from [0.1, 0.6]. Notice
that ci(xi) is strongly convex with Lipschitz continuous
gradient.
The price is taken as a linear function P (ξ) = P¯−D(ξ)Ax
where each component of P¯ = col(P¯1, . . . , P¯7) is randomly
drawn from [2, 4]. The uncertainty appears in the quantities
D(ξ) = diag{d1(ξ1), . . . , d7(ξ7)} that concern the total
supply for each market. The entries of D(ξ) are taken with
a normal distribution with mean 0.8 and finite variance. As
in [7] we suppose that the dual variables graph is a cycle
graph with the addiction of the edges (2, 15) and (6, 13).
Recall that the cost function of agent i is influenced by the
variables of the companies selling in the same market. This
information can be retrieved from the graph in Fig. 3.
The step sizes are the same for all agents i: αi = 0.03,
νi = 0.2, σi = 0.03. The initial point xi,0 is randomly chosen
within its local feasible set, and the initials dual variables λi,0
and zi,0 are set to zero. The damping parameter is taken to
be δ ∈ {0.4, 0.7, 1} to compare the results.
The plots in Fig. 1 and 2 show respectively the following
performance indices:
‖xk+1−x
∗‖
‖x∗‖ and ‖L⊗ I7 λk‖. The first
one indicates the convergence to a solution x∗, while the
second shows convergence of the dual variables to consensus.
As one can see from the plots, the higher the averaging
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Fig. 2. Disagreement between the dual variables.
parameter the faster is the convergence. The fact that the
solution oscillates is due to the approximation but we want
to focus on the fact that the distance from the solution is
decreasing. Moreover, it is interesting that for δ = 1 the
algorithm is indeed a FB algorithm without damping and it
converges with constant stepsize.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preconditioned forward–backward operator splitting is
applicable to stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems to design distributed equilibrium seeking algorithms.
Since the expected value is hard to compute in general,
the sample average approximation can be used to ensure
convergence almost surely.
Our simulations show that the damping step may be
unnecessary for convergence. We will investigate this case
as future research.
REFERENCES
[1] F. Facchinei and C. Kanzow, “Generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems,” Annals of Operations Research, vol. 175, no. 1, pp. 177–211,
2010.
[2] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for
concave n-person games,” 1964.
M1
M2
M3 M4
M5
M6
M7
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6 C7
C8C9
C10
C11
C12
C13
C14
C15 C16
C20
C18
C19
C17
Fig. 3. Interference graph.
[3] F. Facchinei and J.-S. Pang, Finite-dimensional variational inequalities
and complementarity problems. Springer Science & Business Media,
2007.
[4] L. Pavel, “An extension of duality to a game-theoretic framework,”
Automatica, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 226–237, 2007.
[5] A. A. Kulkarni and U. V. Shanbhag, “On the variational equilibrium as
a refinement of the generalized nash equilibrium,” Automatica, vol. 48,
no. 1, pp. 45–55, 2012.
[6] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “Projected-gradient algorithms
for generalized equilibrium seeking in aggregative games are pre-
conditioned forward-backward methods,” in 2018 European Control
Conference (ECC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 2188–2193.
[7] P. Yi and L. Pavel, “An operator splitting approach for distributed
generalized Nash equilibria computation,” Automatica, vol. 102, pp.
111–121, 2019.
[8] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “Semi-decentralized Nash equilib-
rium seeking in aggregative games with separable coupling constraints
and non-differentiable cost functions,” IEEE control systems letters,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 400–405, 2017.
[9] H. H. Bauschke, P. L. Combettes et al., Convex analysis and monotone
operator theory in Hilbert spaces. Springer, 2011, vol. 408.
[10] C.-K. Yu, M. Van Der Schaar, and A. H. Sayed, “Distributed learning
for stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Signal Processing, vol. 65, no. 15, pp. 3893–3908, 2017.
[11] U. Ravat and U. V. Shanbhag, “On the characterization of solution
sets of smooth and nonsmooth convex stochastic Nash games,” SIAM
Journal on Optimization, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1168–1199, 2011.
[12] H. Xu and D. Zhang, “Stochastic Nash equilibrium problems: sample
average approximation and applications,” Computational Optimization
and Applications, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 597–645, 2013.
[13] D. Watling, “User equilibrium traffic network assignment with stochas-
tic travel times and late arrival penalty,” European Journal of Opera-
tional Research, vol. 175, no. 3, pp. 1539–1556, 2006.
[14] R. Henrion and W. Ro¨misch, “On m-stationary points for a stochastic
equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints in electricity spot
market modeling,” Applications of Mathematics, vol. 52, no. 6, pp.
473–494, 2007.
[15] V. DeMiguel and H. Xu, “A stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg
model: analysis, computation, and application,” Operations Research,
vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 1220–1235, 2009.
[16] I. Abada, S. Gabriel, V. Briat, and O. Massol, “A generalized Nash–
Cournot model for the northwestern european natural gas markets with
a fuel substitution demand function: The gammes model,” Networks
and Spatial Economics, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1–42, 2013.
[17] R. I. Bot, P. Mertikopoulos, M. Staudigl, and P. T. Vuong, “Forward-
backward-forward methods with variance reduction for stochastic
variational inequalities,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.03355, 2019.
[18] A. Iusem, A. Jofre´, R. I. Oliveira, and P. Thompson, “Extragradient
method with variance reduction for stochastic variational inequalities,”
SIAM Journal on Optimization, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 686–724, 2017.
[19] J. Koshal, A. Nedic, and U. V. Shanbhag, “Regularized iterative
stochastic approximation methods for stochastic variational inequality
problems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 58, no. 3,
pp. 594–609, 2013.
[20] F. Yousefian, A. Nedic´, and U. V. Shanbhag, “On smoothing, reg-
ularization, and averaging in stochastic approximation methods for
stochastic variational inequality problems,” Mathematical Program-
ming, vol. 165, no. 1, pp. 391–431, 2017.
[21] ——, “Optimal robust smoothing extragradient algorithms for stochas-
tic variational inequality problems,” in 53rd IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control. IEEE, 2014, pp. 5831–5836.
[22] L. Rosasco, S. Villa, and B. C. Vu˜, “Stochastic forward–backward
splitting for monotone inclusions,” Journal of Optimization Theory
and Applications, vol. 169, no. 2, pp. 388–406, 2016.
[23] D. P. Palomar and Y. C. Eldar, Convex optimization in signal process-
ing and communications. Cambridge university press, 2010.
[24] F. Facchinei, A. Fischer, and V. Piccialli, “On generalized Nash games
and variational inequalities,” Operations Research Letters, vol. 35,
no. 2, pp. 159–164, 2007.
[25] A. N. Iusem, A. Jofre´, R. I. Oliveira, and P. Thompson, “Variance-
based extragradient methods with line search for stochastic variational
inequalities,” SIAM Journal on Optimization, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 175–
206, 2019.
[26] A. Kannan and U. V. Shanbhag, “The pseudomonotone stochastic
variational inequality problem: Analytical statements and stochastic
extragradient schemes,” in 2014 American Control Conference. IEEE,
2014, pp. 2930–2935.
